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1. Introduction 
During the last few years, there has been a hotly debated discussion 
about the desirability of fiscal reform in Mexico. The reasons in favor 
of such a reform are basically to improve the efficiency of the tax sys-
tem as well as to increase the revenue generating capacity of the gov-
ernment in order to obtain additional resources to satisfy basic social 
needs such as education, health and infrastructure that may allow 
the economy to grow at faster rafes (OECD, 2004: Foro Consultivo 
Científico y Tecnológico. 2004: Webb, 2001; and Dalsgaard. 2000.
1 
Remarkably, these discussions typically focuses on static, short-run is-
sues while leaving aside the effect such a reform may have on long-run 
growth and social welfare (see. for example, Foro Consultivo Cientí-
fico y Tecnológico, 2004; and Trigueros and Fernández, 2001). 
The goal of this paper is thus to provide a quantitative estimate 
of the effects of a fiscal reform on growth and welfare in Mexico from a 
general equilibrium perspective. In particular, two questions are ad-
dressed. First, what is the effect of alternative tax reforms on long-run 
growth and welfare if they are designed to keep government expen-
diture share in total output constant? And second, if government 
expenditures in terms of output are now allowed to increase, which 
among the available taxes necessary to finance this extra expendit ure 
is the least distorting? 
To answer these questions, a neoclassical monetary model with 
endogenous growth is proposed where the infinitely long-liver! rep-
resentative household derives utility from consumption and leisure. 
Money is introduced in this model via a standard cash-in-advance 
constraint, whereas endogenous growth is explained by a process of 
human capital accumulation, as in Lucas (1988, 1990). The model 
considers four alternative tax instruments: seigniorage, capital and la-
bor income taxes, and lump-sum taxes, necessary to finance wasteful 
government expenditures.
2 For the model purposes, a tax reform is 
1 For a review of tax reforms implemented in Mexico since 1970, see Gil-Diaz 
and Thirsk (1997) and Gil-Diaz (1990). Dalsgaard (2000) includes a summary of 

















sometimes argued that a monetary expansion is benehcal for capital accumulation 
and thus growth (Romero, 2000) This type ot argument is reflected by the 
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defined as the change in two tax instruments relative to the original 
tax policy (including seigniorage revenue) so that the budget con-
straint of the government is balanced in a present-value sense. This 
implies that a change in a distorting tax may be financed by a change 
in either a lump-sum tax or an alternative distorting tax. 
The evaluation of the growth and welfare effects of tax reforms 
under the four tax instruments mentioned above is not common in the 
representative agent literature.
3 For example, the growth and welfare 
effects of income taxation usually abstract from the use of money (see, 
among others, Chamley, 1981; King and Rebelo, 1990; Lucas, 1990; 
Jones Manuelli, and Rossi, 1993; and Ortigueira, 1998). Similarly, 
the distorting effects of inflation are usually estimated assuming lump-
sum taxes in place (see, for example, Cooley and Hansen, 1989: and 
Gomme, 1993; Dotsey and Ireland, 1996; and Wu and Zhang, 2000). 
However, as pointed out by Cooley and Hansen (1991, 1992), the 
relationship between alternative sources of revenue (for example, the 
fiscal implications of lower taxation on money holdings) may have 
important consequences for the appropriate estimation of growth and 
welfare. 
The present paper contains several differences with respect to 
those in the literature that explicitly study the interaction between 
seigniorage and income taxes in representative agent models. For 
example, the estimation of tax reforms in the monetary model of 
Cooley and Hansen (1991, 1992) takes place in an exogenous growth 
context. Nevertheless, it is well known that the effect of income taxes 
on the allocation of time and thus on long-run growth should not be 
ignored (see, for example, Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1998). Jones 
and Manuelli (1995) find that the welfare cost of inflation is similar 
under endogenous and exogenous growth models alike, even under in-
come taxation. The problem with their estimates is that welfare com-
parisons are made across steady states only, a problem also present 
in the AK models of Palivos and Yip (1995) and Smith (1996). As 
is well known (cf. Lucas, 1990; Ortismeira, 1998), ignorine; transi-
tional dynamic effects on welfare analysis may be misleading As de-
scribed later, the results presented here take fully into account these 
short-run effects on welfare. Finally, the closest paper in spirit to the 
present work is found in Wen and Love (1998). They consider a hu-
man capital-type endogenous growth model where money enters via 
a shopping-time technology. Unfortunately, the tax reform calcula-
3 Notable exceptions are Cooley and Hansen (1991, 1992), Jones and Manuelli 
(1995), Palivos and Yip (1995), Smith (1996) and Wen and Love (1998). 146 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
tions presented by these authors are inaccurate in the sense that the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government is not satisfied, a 
problem appropriately addressed here. 
To provide a numeric answer to the questions originally posed 
above, the model is carefully calibrated to match the features of the 
Mexican economy. Next, tax reform exercises are performed where 
only one of the three distorting taxes is eliminated and replaced either 
by higher lump-sum or distorting taxes, while keeping government ex-
penditures fixed.
4 An important feature of this work is that the net 
welfare effect of a fiscal reform is conveniently disentangled into three 
components: a long-run growth effect, a long-run level effect, and a 
short-nm. transitional effect as in Cassou and Lansing (2003). This 
division turns out to be important because, as shown later, a fiscal 
reform that yields the highest long-run growth rate is not necessarily 
the policy that yields the highest welfare because of possible counter-
vailing level and short-run effects. 
All the simulations show that the long-run growth rate is not 
significantly affected by a tax reform designed to keep public expen-
ditures constant: the annual growth rate increases from 1.54 to at 
most 1.65 percent. This result is consistent with those previously 
found for the US economy (see Stokey and Rebelo, 1995; and Men¬
doza, Milesi-Ferreti, and Asea, 1997).
5' Welfare may either increase or 
decrease depending on the tax policy in place, but any such change is 
well below 1.1 percent in absolute value, a result also consistent with 
the conjecture by Lucas (1990). 
The results are slightly different if government's share in total 
output is increased. In such a case, the long-run growth rate in-
creases modestly unless taxes on labor income are used to balance 
the government's budget (cf. Devereux and Love, 1995; Mendoza, 
Milesi-Ferreti, and Asea, 1997; Baler and Glomm. 2001). The intu-
ition is that the implied lower share of consumption in total output 
4 In the case of seigniorage, the exercise involves driving the inflation rate 
down to zero. 
5 Of course, this finding does not necessarily mean that a tax reform is un-
appealing from a policy point of view. First, it may be the case that the growth 
rate of the economy is substantially higher along the transition to a new balanced 
growth path with a low speed of convergence towards such a new path. In other 
words, the transitional growth rate may well be above its long-run estimate for a 
relative long period. Second, an appropriate tax reform may move the economy 
to a higher level of per capita output and consumption over time even though the 
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leads the household to reallocate her time from leisure towards work-
ing and schooling time, thus increasing the long-run growth rate of 
the economy. It turns out that neither seigniorage nor capital income 
taxes have a substantial effect on the household's allocation of time, 
so the growth rate remains high. However, labor income taxes do 
affect working and schooling negatively. This negative effect domi-
nates the effect from higher government expenditures so the output 
growth rate in fact decreases. Even though the increase in long-run 
growth under seigniorage and capital income taxes is not particularly 
large (the highest value is 1.63 percent for a government's share of 20 
percent), the corresponding fall in welfare is substantial (slightly less 
than 11 percent). 
From the discussion above, the results imply that an appropriate 
tax reform keeping government expenditures constant may yield the 
same effect on long-run growth as the policy with increasing govern-
ment expenditures but with a fraction of the cost in terms of welfare. 
Thus, according to the model a fiscal reform that increases waste-
ful government expenditures to promote long-run growth is highly 
inefficient. 
In relation to the consequences of a lower inflation rate, the model 
finds a negligible positive effect of such a policy on both long-run 
growth and welfare. In particular, moving from the historical inflation 
rate in Mexico to a zero inflation rate brings about an increase of 0.01 
percentage points in the growth rate and a 0.05 percent increase in net 
welfare if lump-sum taxes are available. The small positive effect of 
lower inflation on growth is roughly consistent with similar theoretical 
models (c/. Chari, Jones, and Manuelli, 1995) and empirical evidence 
(see. for example, Levine and Renelt, 1992; Fischer, 1991, 1993; and 
Barro, 1995, 1997). 
The final lesson from the numeric simulations is that the policy-
maker might be faced with conflicting goals when evaluating a fiscal 
reform. In some cases, the fiscal reform that yields the highest growth 
rate is simultaneously the policy that yields the lowest welfare, and 
vice versa (c/. Cassou and Lansing, 2003). The reason is that the pos-
itive effect of higher growth on welfare may be easily offset by nega-
tive welfare effects caused by short-run and long-run level distortions. 
Thus the decision about which fiscal policy reform to implement in 
practice might well end up depending on the policymaker's goals. 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The next section 
presents the basic model. The third section discusses the calibra-
tion of the model for Mexico under particular utility and production 
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rises on both long-run growth and welfare. Section four concludes by 
including some ways in which the model may be extended. 
2. The model 
The framework considered is a standard, deterministic endogenous 
growth model with infinite horizon where a representative agent is 
endowed with perfect foresight and a single unit of time that may 
be devoted to leisure, working or "schooling" activities. The house-
hold derives utility from consumption c(t) and raw (non-qualified) 
leisure x(t) where 0 < x(t) < 1. The instantaneous utility function 
U(c(t),x(t)) is bounded, continuously differential, strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave and non-separable in its arguments. The house-
hold maximizes the discounted sum of utilities over time at the rate 
p>0 according to: 
The household keeps assets in the form of money holdings m(t) 
and ownership claims on physical capital k(t). The representative 
agent is endowed with a stock of human capital h(t) in addition. 
Accordingly, her flow budget constraint is given by: 
c(t) + k(t) + q(t) = r(t)k{t) + w(t)u{t)h(t) + T(t) (2) 
where q{t) = m{t) + n(t)m(t) represents gross investment in real 
money balances, ir(t) is the inflation rate, and r{t) = [1 - rk(t)]r(t) 
and w(t) = [1 - r„(t)] w(t) are the real rate of return on physical cap-
ital and the real wage respectively, both expressed net of taxes. Here, 
Tk(t).T„{t) and T(t) denote taxes on capital and labor income, and 
lump-sum transfers (taxes if T(t) is negative), respectively, and u(t) 
is the fraction of time that the household devotes to the production 
of the single good with 0 < «(<) < 1. For simplicity, no depreciation 
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constraint is generalized by introducing the degree of liquidity con-
straint faced by the household, namely the fraction of consumption 
goods that must be purchased with money. Such exogenous fraction 
is denoted as 4>, where 0 < <j> < 1. Therefore, 
4>c(t) < "»(0 (
4) 
In order to allow for endogenous growth, it is assumed that hu-
man capital accumulation may be affected by the way households 
allocate their time. Accordingly, if v(t) denotes the fraction of time 
devoted to schooling activities, the law of motion for human capital 
is given by: 
h(t) = h(t)H[v(t)} (5) 
where H (•) is a continuously differentiable. increasing and concave 
function, and 0 < v(t) < 1. 
Finally, it must hold that: 
u(t) + v(t)+x(t) = l (6) 
There is perfect competition among firms. Technology is rep-
resented by a production function F[k{t),u{t)h(t)} with constant re-
turns to scale in the stock of physical capital k(t) and in the effective 
amount of labor v(t)h(t). The function F[k(t), u(t)h(t)} is continu-
ously differentiable, concave, increasingly monotone and satisfies the 
well-known Inada conditions. 
Profit maximization implies that both factors of production are 
paid their marginal products, i.e., 
w(t) = Fn[k(t),u{t)h(t)} (7) 
and 
r(t) = Fk[k{t),u{t)h(t)} (8) 
where denotes the marginal product of the factor of production 
i = k,n. 
The single good produced in this economy may be devoted either 
to consumption, investment i(t) or government purchases of goods 
and services g(t). The role of government is to provide currency and 
to impose taxes on capital income, labor income and money holdings 
in order to finance the exogenous stream of government expenditures 
g(t). Any difference between taxation and expenditures may be cov-
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Money is issued at the rate u(t) = M(t)/M(t), where M(t) is the 
(nominal) money supply. Equilibrium in the money market is thus 
reached when the nominal price level P(t) adjusts so that real money 
demand equals real money supply, m(t) = M{t)/P(t). Thus, 
m{t)/w.{t)= ti(t)~n(t) (9) 
The amount of revenue raised by the government through money 
creation at time t is just M(t)/P{t) = u(t)rn(t). Therefore, the gov-
ernment's budget constraint must satisfy: 
g(t) + T(t) = /*(í)m(í) + rk(t)r(t)k(t) + rn(t)iu(t)u(t)h{t) (10) 
DEFINITION: Given fc(0) = k0,h(0) = h0, and M(0) = M0, a com-
petitive equilibrium, is defined as the set of infinite sequences for allo-
cations {c(t),i(t),k(t),h{t),rn(t),u(t),x{t),v(t)}, factor prices {r(t), 
w{t)}, and government policy rk(t), rn(t)^i{t), g(t),T(t)} such that: 
(i) Given factor prices and government policy, the allocations 
{c(t), i(t), k(t),h{t), m(t), u(t), x(t), v(t)} 
maximize equation (1) subject to equations (2) through (6); 
(ii) The sequence 
{k{t), h(t), m(t), u(t), r(f), w(t), rk(t), Tn(t), p(t), g(t),T(t)} 
satisfies equations (7), (8) and (10); and 
(iii) The goods market clears:
6 
c(t)+i(t)+g(t) = F[k(t),u(t)h(t)] 
It may be readily verified that the solution to the representative 
agent's program is defined by the following first-order conditions: 
Uc(t) = \i(t) + 4>\2{t) (11a) 
6 Walras'law guarantees that equilibrium in the money market, 
m(t) = M{t)/P(t), 
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Ux(t) = Ai(t)tü(t)Mt) (Hb) 
Ai(t) = A4(t) (He) 
Xl(t)=X1(t)[p-f(t)} (Hd) 
A3« = A3(*) {P " H Ut))} - X1(t)w(t)u(t) (lie) 
Ä4(i) = pA4(i)+Ai(i)7r(t)-A2(i) (111) 
A2(i)[m(i)-^Cl(i)]=0,A2(i)>0 (llg) 
plus some well-known transversality conditions. In the above expres-
sions, ¡7,(0 denotes the derivative with respect to the ith argument, 
* = {c,x), and Ai(f), A2(t),A3(t), and A4(i) represent the current-value 
shadow prices of physical capital, the cash -in- advance constraint, 
human capital and money holdings, respectively. 
Expression (11a) above represents the marginal utility of con-
sumption, including the cost of holding money. Equation (lib) sim-
ply states that the marginal utility of leisure must be equal to the 
extra income from an additional unit of working time. The equal-
ity between the price of an extra unit of the consumption good and 
money holdings is represented by (11c). Finally, expressions (lid) -
(llf) 'are the laws of motion for current-value shadow prices. 
Manipulation of (11c), (lid) and (llf) lead to the following ex-
pression: 
A2(t)=Ai(i)fi(i) (12) 
where R(t) = n{t) + f(t) denotes the nominal interest rate (net of 
taxes). From (12), if R(t) > 0 then A2(f) > 0 since the shadow price 
Ai(i) is strictly positive. Therefore, (llg) implies rn(t) = </>c(t) so 
that the cash-in-advance constraint is strictly binding. On the other 
hand, if R(t) = 0 then A2(i) = 0 and the cash-in-advance constraint 
is just binding. In other words, it is always the case that m(t) = 4>c{t) 
(cf. Rebelo and Xie, 1999). 
The following step is to define particular utility and technology 
functions. In the first case, the following CES functional form consis-
tent with the existence of a balanced growth path is proposed (see 
Ladron-de-Guevara, Ortigueira, and Santos, 1997): 152 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
for a > 0. and a / 1, and 0 < ^ < 1, and [/ [c(i), a:(i)] = V' logc(t) + 
(l-^)k>g*(i)lora = l.
7 
The production function F(t) is given by a standard Cobb- Dou-
glas specification F(t) = Ak(t)°•(u(t)h(t))
1-° where 0 < a < 1 and 
A > 0. Following Lucas (1990), human capital technology H {•) is 
expressed as \v(t)} = Bv(t)" where 0 < ?/ < 1 represents the con-
stant elasticity of the learning function with respect to time devoted 
to human capital accumulation, and B > 0 is the constant marginal 
productivity of schooling time. The value of B is restricted so that 
the transversality condition 4,(1 - a)B < p is satisfied. 
Along a balanced growth path, consumption, money holdings, 
physical and human capital are growing at the constant rate 7. 
Namely, 
c(t)/c(t) = rh(t)/m{t) = k(t)/k(t) = h(t)/h(t) = 7 
with v(t)/v{t) = x(t)/x(t) = v(t)/v(t). As usual in this type of 
model, it is convenient to express the equilibrium in terms of new 
variables. In particular, variables are defined relative to the human 
capital stock so that z(t) = k{t)/h(t) and c(t)/h(t). Using the system 
in (11), it may be shown that a balanced growth path is described by 
the values of z\ (c/A)*, it*, x*, v* and 7 that satisfy (see the appendix 
for details): 
(i - 0)(c/M* = »'* (14a) 
ipx* 1 + 4>R* ' 
(c/h)* + (g/h)* = Aiz*)
0^,*)
1-
0 - 7z* (14b) 
7[V>(l-c)-l] = p-r* (14c) 
7 Ladron-de-Guevara, Ortigueira, and Santos (1999) show that the introduc-
tion of non-qualified leisure into an endogenous growth model (like the one con-
sidered here) may lead to a multiplicity of steady states for a relatively broad 
parameter space in a framework with no money and non-distorting taxes. As dis-
cussed later in this paper, this potential problem does not arise for the parameter 
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y = B(l-u* -x*)«  (14d) 
f * = 7 1 +  7 
1 - u* -
x* 
(14e) 
together with the time constraint (6). Along the balanced growth 
path, g{t) and T{t) grow at the endogenous rate 7 in order to avoid 
that g/h and T/h would be zero in the limit.
8 
Equation (14a) is simply the intratemporal optimality condition 
between consumption and leisure, which is equal to the after-tax real 
wage expressed in terms of the price of the consumption good includ-
ing the cost of holding money. Expression (14b) denotes the resource 
constraint evaluated along the balanced growth path. The otherwise 
standard Euler equation in a model with non-separable leisure is rep-
resented by (14c), where the long-run growth rate depends on the 
after-tax real rate of return on capital. The law of motion for human 
capital along the balanced growth path is included in (14d). Finally, 
the equality between the net rate of return of physical and human 
capital is summarized by (14e). By substituting (14e) into (14c), it 
becomes clear that the endogenous growth rate 7 is a function only 
of schooling time, the time devoted to work, and parameter values of 
the model 
3. Growth and welfare effects of alternative fiscal policies 
3.1. Preliminaries 
The following step is to provide numeric estimates of the effects of al-
ternative fiscal policies on both growth and welfare by taking into ac-
count the model described in the previous section. For that purpose, 
it is assumed that the economy is initially on a balanced growth path. 
Let (c(r),x(r)) denote the corresponding paths of consumption and 
leisure associated with the existing fiscal policy r = r(rFC,T„, n, g,T), 
and fc*(0) and /i*(0) as the initial endowments of physical and human 
capital, respectively. If an alternative fiscal policy f is unexpectedly 
announced, the economy moves out of its initial allocation in order to 
s Both government expenditures and lump-sum transfers are also allowed to 
grow at the same rate as output along the transition path once a change in fiscal 
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converge to a new balanced growth path denoted as (c(f), x(f)). The 
new fiscal policy is assumed to remain constant over time. As usual, 
the household has perfect foresight once the new policy is announced. 
Following Lucas (1987), define C as the compensating consump-
tion supplement necessary for the household to be indifferent between 
the existing policy r and the new fiscal policy f. Accordingly, the wel-
fare gain of a fiscal reform is measured as the value of C that solves: 
j e-
ptU [(1 + C)c(r), x(r)]dt = J er
ptU [c(f), x{f )]dt  (15) 
o  u 
For clarity purposes, it is convenient to disentangle the welfare 
gain (or loss) ( into three major components as in Cassou and Lans-
ing (2003): a long-run level effect {Qevci), a long-run growth effect 
((growth), and a transition (short-run) effect «frcm,)-
9 As shown in 
the appendix, the sum of these three effects yields the net welfare 
gain (1lct implicitly given by (15). 
Throughout this paper, a tax reform may be defined alternatively 
in two ways. The first of them assumes that only one of the distorting 
taxes available changes, while keeping government expenditures con-
stant. This requires that lump-sum taxes finance any imbalance in 
the government budget constraint (in a present-value sense). The al-
ternative case implies changing two distorting taxes at a time so that 
the intertemporal government budget constraint is satisfied, while 
keeping T(t) and g(t) fixed. These two possibilities are considered in 
the computations below. 
3.2. Calibration 
The model is now calibrated for the Mexican economy. For clarity 
purposes, the distinction is made between those parameters borrowed 
9 The long-run growth effect measures the welfare change due exclusively to 
a change in the growth rate 7 whenever a new fiscal policy is adopted. Similarly, 
the long-run level effect captures the welfare change due to a change in the level 
of the variables along the new balanced growth path. Finally, the transition 
effect incorporates short-run changes in the variables of interest and their effect 
on welfare. Either a higher growth rate or a higher level of long-run consumption 
and leisure yields higher welfare, whereas a short-run fall in both consumption 
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from the literature and those specially fixed to match some observed 
variables from the data. For convenience, both initial output and the 
initial stock of human capital are normalized to unity as in Lucas 
(1990). 
The following parameter values are either taken from the litera-
ture or from the data: 
(i) a = 0.45. The share of capital income in total output for Mexico 
is carefully estimated by Bernanke and Giirkaynak (2001) for the 
period 1980 - 1995, 
(ii) n = 0.55. The elasticity of the learning function is slightly lower 
than the value implicit in the estimates reported in Rosen (1976), 
(iii) o = 1.5. The number given to the inverse of the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution is a standard parameter value (cf. 
Kydland and Prescott, 1982 and Prescott, 1986), 
(iv) n = 0.272. This number corresponds to the annual average 
growth rate of the monetary base in Mexico for the period 1988 
- 2002, 
(v) TFE = 0.085 and, r„ = 0.125. The values for the effective tax rates 
on physical capital and labor income in Mexico, respectively, are 
well within the range reported in Anton (2004), 
(vi) g/h = 0.132. Given the normalization in both initial output and 
human capital, this value represents the share of government ex-
penditures (including public investment) in net national product 
NNP (ignoring imports and exports) for the period 1988 - 2002. 
Parameters that are jointly calibrated to match some features of 
the data include the following: 
(i) A = 0.653. This technology parameter value yields an output 
equal to 1 in the benchmark economy, 
(ii) B = 0.051. The marginal productivity of schooling time is fixed 
so that the growth rate 7 along the balanced growth path is 1.54 
percent. This last number is consistent with the GDP per capita 
growth rate in Mexico for the period 1988 - 2000, according to 
data by Heston, Summers, Aten (2002),
1
0 
(iii) p = 0.02. The value for the subjective discount rate yields a 
reasonable after-tax real rate of return on capital of 3.9 percent 
along the balanced growth path, 
w The calibration for the benchmark economy implies an inflation rate of 25.7 
along the balanced growth path, according to equation (9). Remarkably, this 
number roughly corresponds to the average inflation rate in Mexico for the period 
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(iv) <(> = 0.047. The parameter for the cash-in-advance constraint 
is fixed so that the ratio of seigniorage to net national product 
ratio is 0.90 percent, which is simply the average value observed 
in Mexico for the period 1988 - 2002, 
(v) V = 0.45. The weight of consumption in total utility is chosen 
so that hours worked along the balanced growth path are about 
one third of household's endowed time.
1
1 This share is consistent 
with the data as reported by the Encuesta national sobre uso 
del tiempo, 2002 by INEGI, where population between 20 and 59 
years spend about one third of their discretionary time (i.e., time 




Parameter values are conveniently summarized in table 1. As it 
may be observed, the ratio of lump-sum transfers over human capital 
along the balanced growth path implied by the calibration above and 
equation (10) is -0.016.
1
3 The corresponding consumption-output ra-
tio for the benchmark economy is 0.705, a number roughly consistent 
with the share of consumption of non-durables and services in net 
national product (ignoring imports and exports) for the period 1988 
- 2002 in Mexico. 
Table 1 
Parameter Values for the Benchmark Economy 
Technology parameters 
a = 0.45, A = 0.653, B = 0.051, n = 0.55 
Preference parameters 
P = 0.02, a = 1.5, j, = 0.45, </> = 0.047 
Monetary and fiscal policy parameters 
p = 0.272, rk = 0.085, r„ = 0.125, 
(g/h)* = 0.132, (T/h)* = -0.016 
1
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attfienational level in Mexico. 
Alternatively, this number may be mterpreted as the prnnary deficit of the 
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Before presenting the results, it is important to note that all the 
numeric exercises shown below exhibit a unique negative eigenvalue. 
This means that, at least for the parameter space under study, there 
is a (locally) unique, saddle path stable manifold. In addition, a 
unique steady state is always found for all the exercises considered. 
As mentioned above, this last result is not trivial given that both 
utility and human capital technology are functions of non-qualified 
leisure in this model. 
3.3. Results 
The first series of tax reform exercises are presented in table 2. The 
first part of the table assumes that lump-sum taxes are available to re-
store any imbalance in the government's budget constraint whenever 
a distorting tax is changed. For convenience, the first row reports the 
results for the growth rate, welfare, and levels of some variables of in-
terest along the balanced growth path under the benchmark economy. 
Naturally, the welfare estimates are zero in this case. 
The first tax reform exercise simply decreases the growth rate 
of money from 27.2 to 1.54 percent so that the inflation rate is zero 
under the benchmark (see equation (9). As a result, the growth rate 
7 slightly increases to 1.55 percent as reported by the second row 
of table 2. There is a negligible overall welfare gain of 0.05 percent, 
consisting of a 0.35 percent fall due to a long-run level effect, a 0.42 
percent increase due to the long-run growth effect, and a 0.02 percent 
fall explained by a transitional (short-run) effect. Time devoting to 
schooling and leisure, as well as the consumption-output ratio, remain 
nearly unchanged. 
Now an alternative tax reform exercise is considered. The third 
row shows the results assuming that the tax on capital income is 
entirely eliminated in the spirit of Chamley (1986). The increase 
in the growth rate is too small, despite a relatively large fall in rk. 
This result may not be very surprising to the reader: in this model, 
the long-run growth rate of the economy is basically explained by 
the time devoted to education and working activities', which are not 
substantially affected by changes in capital income taxes. On the 
other hand,' the increase in net welfare is higher than before (0.70 
percent as compared to 0.05 percent). Such an increase is mostly due 
to a positive and large long-run level effect. 
The next, tax reform simulation eliminates the tax on labor in-
come. The increase in the growth rate to 1.65 percent is the highest 158 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
of all the three exercises: the elimination of labor income taxes leads 
households to devote more time to education and working activities, 
thus increasing the long-run growth rate. Nevertheless, the increase 
in net welfare is just ranked second: even though the growth effect 
increases welfare in 4.7 percent, this is easily compensated by a fall 
of 4.4 percent from the long-run level effect. 
The second part of table 2 now eliminates lump-sum taxation 
from the analysis. Thus any tax reform in place involves simultaneous 
changes in two distorting taxes in order to balance the intertemporal 
budget constraint of the government. The first and second rows of 
part B assume a decrease in the growth rate of money to 1.54 percent 
with simultaneous increases in either capital or labor income taxes to 
10.4 and 14.1 percent, respectively. The results are about the same 
as those under lump-sump taxation, with the exception of welfare. In 
the first case, both the level and the transition effects are magnified 
in absolute value for a resulting net welfare fall of 0.12 percentage 
points. When labor taxes are increased to compensate for the fall 
in seigniorage revenue, the fall in the growth effect dominates the 
long-run level effect for a net welfare loss of 0.03 percentage points. 
The next two rows present simulations where the tax on capital 
income is eliminated and lost revenue is replaced either with higher 
seigniorage or labor income taxation. As shown, this exercise either 
requires a money growth rate of about 149 percent or a labor income 
tax of 19.5 percent. The results in both cases are qualitatively similar: 
there is a relatively small fall in the growth rate (in relation to its 
benchmark) explained bv the fall in schooling and working time, and 
a small increase in net welfare, motivated mostly by the large increase 
from the level effect. 
Finally, the last two rows perform a tax reform exercise involving 
zero taxes on labor income. As a result of the large inflation involved 
when revenue is raised through seigniorage, the growth rate decreases 
from the corresponding 1.65 percent value under lump sum taxation 
to 1.58 percent, although this rate is still above its benchmark value. 
The positive effect of growth on welfare results in a net increase in 
household's utility. As for capital income taxes, the growth rate is 
just the same if compared to the lump-sum taxation case, but now 
net welfare is negative explained bv the large fall from the level effect. 
From table 2, the result that" large increases in the growth rate 
of money (and thus inflation) have a small effect on both long-run 
growth and welfare should be interpreted with caution. As argued 
elsewhere (Benabou, 1991: Wright. 1991). this type of models seems 
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ney well above 148 percent like in the present case, there is a pre-
sumption that additional social costs not well captured in this type 
of models may be present (see, for example, Cooley and Hansen, 
1989). On the other hand, the negligible effects of high inflation rates 
on long-run growth found along table 2 are inconsistent with empir-
ical evidence (cf. Levine and Renelt. 1992; Fischer, 1991, 1993; and 
Barro, 1995, 1997). This theoretical inconsistency is pursued further 
in Jones and Manuelli (1995) and Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995). 
In particular, after calibrating a variety of endogenous growth models 
with money, Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995) find that an increase 
of at least 10 percentage points in the growth rate of money is un-
able to reproduce the negative effect of 0.2 to 0.7 percentage points 
on output growth typically found in the data. The intuition is that 
changes in output growth rates require changes in real rates of re-
turn to capital. However, changes in inflation rates in this type of 
models have trivial effects on real rates of return and thus on output 
growth rates (cf. Jones and Manuelli, 1995). In the present model, 
real rates of return depend on household's allocation of time, which 
is not substantially affected by large increases in the growth rate of 
money.
1'' 
Once this observation is taken into account, the numeric simu-
lations in table 2 imply that the policymaker might be faced with 
conflicting decisions at the time of implementing a tax reform. To 
see this more clearly, consider first the case of lump-sum taxation. In 
terms of growth rates, the most desirable policy among all the sim-
ulations performed would be to completely eliminate labor income 
taxes. Nevertheless, such a policy does not yield the highest welfare 
of all the tax reforms under study. If. on the other hand, household 
welfare is the most important criterion to evaluate the desirability of 
a tax reform, then capital income taxes should be eliminated: welfare 
gains under such a policy are about seven times larger than under the 




4 This last result does not depend on the value for the degree of the liquidity 
constraint </>. For example, Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995) arrive at a similar 
conclusion under 0 = 1. 
1
5 If welfare effects are studied in more detail, eliminating capital income taxes 
is too costly in the short-run (given the corresponding substitution from consump-
tion to physical capital), and the gains of such a reform are only perceived in the 
long run. For labor income taxes, the negative effect in short-run welfare is small, 
and the long run welfare gains from the growth effect are enough to compensate 
for the welfare loss derived from the level effect. A MONETARY MODEL: THE CASE OF MEXICO  161 
The same conflicting decision emerges when the results for dis-
torting taxes are examined. Once again the most desirable tax re-
form in terms of growth rates is the elimination of labor income taxes 
compensated now by higher taxes on capital income. However, such 
a policy yields the largest fall in welfare of all the simulations pre-
sented. If welfare is the relevant policy criterion instead and large 
increases in seigniorage are ignored, in accordance with the previous 
discussion, then capital income taxes should be eliminated and re-
placed with higher labor income taxes. However, the problem with 
such a choice is that it delivers the lowest growth rate of all. 
So far, the previous simulations have kept fixed the share of gov-
ernment expenditures in total output. However, some argue that a fis-
cal reform in Mexico should allow for higher government expenditures 
in order to finance important social needs such as education, health 
and infrastructure, among others (OECD, 2004; Foro Consultivo Cien-
tífico y Tecnológico, 2004; Webb, 2001; and Dalsgaard, 2000). If such 
a proposal is adopted, there are two issues of interest from a general 
equilibrium perspective. First, there is the effect of higher govern-
ment spending itself on both the long-run growth rate and welfare 
of the economy. In addition, the issue of which tax instruments can 
be used to finance this extra expenditure with the least amount of 
distortion remains. 
Table 3 show the effect of higher government expenditures in 
terms of human capital on growth, welfare and relevant variables of 
the model. As before, the table is divided in two parts, depending 
on whether lump-sum or distorting taxes are available to keep the in-
tertemporal budget constraint of the government balanced. For con-
venience, the first row again reproduces the results under the bench-
mark economy. 
The row just below the benchmark reports the effect of an in-
crease in the \g/h)* ratio from 13.2 to 15 percent when lump-sum 
taxes are available. The long-run growth rate slightly increases from 
its benchmark value of 1.54 to 1.56 percent. The intuition of this 
result is simple: as the ratio of consumption over output decreases by 
about 2 percentage points, the household must devote a lower fraction 
of her time to leisure and more to working and schooling activities. 
Thus, the reallocation of time is responsible for the increase in the 
growth rate, not the increase in government expenditures per se.
16 
i
b This result is also found elsewhere in the literature (c/. Devereux and Love, 
1995; Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea, 1997; and Baier and Glomm, 2001). 
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Nevertheless, the fall in net welfare is substantial in this case (2.4 
percent). If the (g/h)* ratio increases even further to 20 percent, the 
growth rate is now 1.63 (for a similar reason as before) but the net 
welfare loss increases about 3.8 times in absolute value with respect 
to the previous case for an astonishing net welfare loss of 9.2 percent. 
The second part of table 3 reports similar exercises under dis-
torting taxation. The idea is that increases in relative government 
expenditure have to be financed with increases in a single distorting 
tax at a time. The first three rows show an increase in the {g/h)* 
ratio from its benchmark value to 15 percent, financed alternatively 
by higher taxes on money holdings, capital and labor income, re-
spectively. The last three rows report a similar exercise when {g/h)* 
increases even further to 20 percent. 
Note that increases in relative government expenditure require 
large increases in the growth rate of money as high as to 257 percent 
when (g/h)* = 0.20. Even though these large increases in /z, the 
long-run growth rate 7 remains unchanged, a result consistent with 
the discussion above. On the other hand, the fall in welfare is only 
slightly larger if compared to its corresponding lump-sum taxation 
case. Once again, these results should be viewed with caution, as the 
model may not account for additional welfare costs associated with 
inflation rates well above 50 percent. 
If the analysis is restricted to capital and labor income taxes, 
the results are clear under the two alternative scenarios for the ratio 
(g/h)*: the growth rate 7 increases relative to its benchmark if capital 
income taxes are used, but it decreases if labor income taxes are 
in place instead. As before, an increase in the capital income tax 
does not have an additional effect on household's allocation of time. 
Thus the growth rate is the same as under lump-sum taxation. In 
contrast, the increase in labor income taxes makes the household both 
to work less and devote less time to schooling activities. As a result, 
the growth rate falls relative to its benchmark value. On the other 
hand, net welfare naturally decreases even further (as compared to the 
lump-sum case) under any scenario, the fall being slightly larger when 
capital income taxes are used. Such a decrease is mostly explained 
by the large fall in welfare coming from the long-run level effect, as 




There are two important observations from table 3. First, the 
u An interesting thing to notice from these exercises is the composition of 
the welfare effect for each case. Even though increases in both capital and labor 
income taxes bring about similar effects in net welfare regardless of the increase 164 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
policymaker once again might be faced with conflicting policies. Un-
der lump-sum taxes, higher government expenditures increase the 
long run growth rate of the economy by the indirect effect on the 
household's allocation of time, but welfare decreases significantly as 
a result, the fall being larger the larger the growth rate. If distorting 
taxes are available instead, imposing higher taxes on capital income 
is the best policy in terms of long-run growth rates but it is the worst 
of all using a welfare criterion. 
Second, restricting the analysis to the distorting taxation case, 
the highest growth rate obtained for a 20 percent share of government 
expenditures is 1.63 percent. Remarkably, this growth rate is roughly 
similar to the one obtained under fixed government expenditures and 
zero labor income taxes compensated by higher capital income taxes, 
as shown by the last row of table 2. Nevertheless, the difference 
in the net welfare loss between these policies is too large (about 9 
percentage points). In other words, if the policymaker is interested in 
increasing the growth rate of output, a fiscal reform involving higher 
government expenditures would simply be too costly to implement in 
terms of social welfare, given that an equally effective but less costly 
alternative is available. 
Before closing this section, it is interesting to compare some of 
the results reported here with those found elsewhere in the litera-
ture, where models are typically calibrated for the US economy. The 
first issue is related to the welfare cost of inflation. Using an exoge-
nous growth framework, Cooley and Hansen (1991) find that moving 
towards a zero inflation rate brings about more costs than benefits 
if distorting taxes are involved to balance the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government. As shown in part B of table 2, the 
endogenous growth model used here provides supporting evidence for 
the findings of Cooley and Hansen (1991).
1
8 
The second issue concerns the effect of distorting taxes on growth. 
In particular, all the simulations in table 2 show that the effect of 
income taxes on growth in general is relatively small. This result is 
typically argued to be the most plausible case (cf. Stokey and Rebelo, 
1995: Mendoza. Milessi-Ferretti, and Asea, 1997). The final topic is 
in (g/h)', the composition of this net effect is substantially different: increases 
in capital income taxes involve larger effects in both the short-run and long-run 
levels compared to increases in labor income taxes. Thus a reform with higher 
capital income taxes would be too costly to implement in the short run. 
1
8 Aiyagari (1990) also argues that moving to a zero inflation rate brings about 
more social costs than benefits. A MONETARY MODEL: THE CASE OF MEXICO  165 
related to the effect of a higher ratio of government expenditures to 
output on long-run growth. Like the simulations presented in table 3, 
Devereux and Love (1995) and Mendoza, Milessi-Ferretti, and Asea 
(1997) find that a higher share of government expenditures has a pos-
itive effect of on growth due to the household's reallocation of time 
in a human-capital style model of endogenous growth.
1
9 Similarly, 
Baier and Glomm (2001) find an inverted u-shape relationship be-
tween the government's share of output and growth in a model where 
government expenditures enter into utility and production functions. 
Thus, for relative small values of government expenses over output 
(as assumed here), increasing this ratio in their model also delivers a 
positive effect on growth. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The goal of this paper has been two-fold. First, to understand the 
effects of revenue-neutral tax reforms on growth and welfare for the 
Mexican economy, where the tax instruments available are lump-sum, 
seigniorage, and factor income taxes. Second, to analyze the impli-
cations of a higher ratio of government expenditures to output on 
long-run growth and welfare. For that purpose, a neoclassical en-
dogenous growth model has been presented, where a representative 
household with endogenous labor supply must use money in order 
to purchase consumption goods. As is well known, the advantage of 
this type of models is the special emphasis given to distorting taxa-
tion on the decision making of households and firms from a general 
equilibrium perspective. 
After carefully calibrating the model for the Mexican economy, it 
is found numerically that any tax reform that keeps constant the share 
of government expenditures in total output has a relatively small ef-
fect on both growth and welfare. For example, for all the exercises 
considered, the growth rate increased from 1.54 to at most 1.65 per-
cent, whereas the maximum increase (decrease) in welfare is about 
0.70 (-1.1) percentage points. In contrast, welfare (but not growth 
rates) is highly sensitive to changes in the government expenditure-
output ratio. It is found that if this ratio increases from its benchmark 
i
y Devereux and Love (1995) perform simulation exercises ignoring the balance 
in the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. The results by Men-
doza, Milessi-Ferretti, and Asea (1997) assume that the increase in government's 
share of output is financed exclusively by lump-sum taxes. 166 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
value of 13.2 to 20 percent, the growth rate may increase up to 1.63 
percent, with an astonishing net welfare loss of about 10.8 percent if 
capital income taxes are increased to balance the government's bud-
get. A major conclusion from this analysis is that if the government 
is concerned about increasing the long-run rate of the economy, an 
appropriate tax reform that changes two distorting taxes and keeps 
government expenditures constant at the same time, should defini-
tively be preferred to a policy involving increases in wasteful govern-
ment expenditures given the huge negative effect on welfare of the 
latter alternative. In other words, a growth-enhancing policy based 
on higher tvasteful government expenditures is simply too costly in 
terms of social welfare. 
A second major conclusion is the small positive effect of a zero 
inflation policy on long-run growth. In particular, moving the histor-
ical inflation rate in Mexico down to zero increases the growth rate 
from 1.54 to just 1.55. The reason is that changes in the inflation rate 
do not affect significantly both the time devoted to work and school-
ing activities, which are the engines of long-run growth in the model. 
As already mentioned, this result is consistent with theoretical and 
empirical findings elsewhere. Thus, this model would indicate that 
the concern about the presumably negative effects of a lower mone-
tary growth rate policy (as the one pursued during the last years in 
Mexico) on output growth is groundless. 
Finally, numeric simulations show that the policymaker might 
be faced with conflicting alternatives at the time of implementing a 
fiscal reform. In particular, it is found that a growth-enhancing re-
form does not necessarily increase net welfare, a result also found by 
Cassou and Lansing (2003) for a model with useful public expendi-
tures. As explained in the text, the reason is that the positive effect of 
higher growth on welfare is only one component in total household's 
utility. It may be the case that either long-run level or transition 
effects (or both) due to the tax reform itself may have an opposite 
impact on total welfare. In the simulations presented above, there are 
some situations where the fiscal reform that yields the higher long-
run growth rate simultaneously yields the lowest welfare among all 
the alternatives considered, and vice versa. The lesson here is that 
the policymaker should be aware of these trade-offs when designing a, 
fiscal reform, and that, in practice, the choice of such a reform might 
well end up depending on the policymaker's objective. 
There are two important shortcomings in the present model. 
First, consumption taxes are completely ignored from the analysis. 
As found bv Pecorino (1993, 1994). Coleman (2000) and Cassou and A MONETARY MODEL: THE CASE OF MEXICO  167 
Lansing (2003), an increase in consumption taxes may generally be 
the preferable choice at the time of implementing a tax reform. Thus 
it would be interesting to see how the results above are affected un-
der this additional tax instrument. This point is of particular interest 
for the Mexican case, since the proposals for a fiscal reform during 
the last years usually involve taxing consumption goods such as food 
and medicines. The second observation relates to the modeling as-
sumption about government expenditures. As presented, the paper 
assumes that government expenditures are simply thrown away: they 
neither provide utility nor affect the productivity of physical or hu-
man capital. In such a case, it might be interesting to extend the 
model in the spirit of Turnovsky (2000), Baier and Gloom (2001), 
and Cassou and Lansing (2003) to check how the results discussed 
above are affected. 
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Appendix 
Deriving equilibrium, conditions along the balanced growth path 
The goal of this section is to clarify how to obtain the system of equa-
tions (14) in the main text along the balanced growth path (BGP). 
Given the functional form for utility, (11a) and (lib) may be com-
bined to yield 
i-x(t) = l + 0A2(Q/Ai(Q 
(1 - V')c(i) w(t)h(t) 
Equation (14a) is obtained by using (12) and the above condition 
evaluated along the BGP. 
To derive (14b). substitute the government's budget constraint 
(10) into the household's budget constraint (2). divide both sides by 
the stock of human capital h{t) and evaluate the resulting expression 
along the BGP. 
Now take logarithms on both sides of (lib) and differentiate with 
respect to time. Using the fact that both the fraction of leisure time 
x(t) and net wages iv(t) grow at a zero rate along the BGP, equation 
(14c) is obtained with the help of (lid). 
Expression (14d) is simply the law of motion for human capital 
evaluated along the balanced growth path. Finally, it may be shown 
that t he optimal allocation of working time u(t) between productive 
and schooling activities implies Ai(<)u>(i) = X3(t)H' [v(t)]. Take logs 
on both sides of this expression and differentiate with respect to time. 
Given that both v(t) and w(t) grow at a zero rate along the BGP, this 
implies that Ai(i) and A3(i) must grow at the same rate along such 
a path. Thus one may use (lid), (lie) and the optimality condition 
for u(t) to get equation (14e). A MONETARY MODEL: THE CASE OF MEXICO  171 
Disentangling net welfare gains 
Following the method of Cassou and Lansing (2003), this appendix 
explains in detail how to disentangle the net welfare gain (or loss) C 
from equation (15) into three components: a long-run level effect, a 
long-run growth effect, and a transitional effect. First define baseline 
utility Ubateline under the existing fiscal policy r = r(rfc,r„, p,g,T) 
as: 
Ubaseline = / " ^ ^ dt (Al) 
0 
Based on the expression above, equation (15) may be rewritten 
as 
Ureform = (1 + tf^UbaseUnc (A2) 
where Ureform denotes household's utility under the new tax policy f. 
The net welfare change C„ei from a fiscal reform in percentage terms 
is thus given by (net = 100<, where C is given by expression (A2). 
Now consider the case where the economy is initially along a 
balanced growth path. Define U as the utility level under such a 
path. By definition, consumption now grows at the constant rate 7 
whereas leisure remains constant. Taking these facts into account in 
equation (Al), the baseline utility level along the balanced growth 
path Uba.dine is given by 
Ubaseline 




where c*.x* are the levels of consumption and leisure along the bal-
anced growth path. The second expression in brackets from the right-
hand side of (A3) captures the effect of long-run growth 7 on utility 
whereas the last term measures the corresponding effect from the lev-
els of consumption and leisure. From the discussion above, the change 
in steady-state welfare C„ may be defined  as 
ùs = 100 
Ubaseline J 
(A4)  1 
where Ureform is the utility level along the new balanced growth path 
once the tax reform is put into place. Now denote (ievcA and (growth 172 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
as the long-run level effect and the long-run growth effect on welfare, 
respectively, in the spirit of expression (A3). Therefore, it must be 
the case that 
1 + tievel + (growth = 1 + Cs.s/100 
'reform 
aseline , 
= (l + wa)(i + wb) 
where Wa = {U reform)
1^ ~ 1 and Wb = {Uba8eline)'^^ - 1. 
As discussed by Cassou and Lansing (2003), a solution for QcvrÀ and 
(growth above may be given by 
I IT 





6 + WaWb 
\Wn\ + \\Vb\J 
Finally, given (net (obtained from the numerical simulation) and 
G.s (computed above), the transition effect Qran, is simply defined as 
the residual (trnns = (net - <„. 